This analysis will encompass the entire spectrum from plan to execution end production to destination. I will use the outstanding logistical efforts demonstrated during
Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the U.S. Army's ability to function as Executive Agent for Class I and how the Army can improve its ability to successfully accomplish the same mission in future conflicts.
Th:.s evaluation of the logistical efforts during
Operatio:, DESERT SHIELD/STORM will obviously focus on U.S.
Army perticipa ion but will cross into the joint arena due to the Army's mission to be executive agent for class I for all forces ashore. \Although tremendous logistical challenges of sustaining over \400,000 troops were overcome, Operations DESERT SHIELD/ST RM were an overwhelming success. For example, Saudi Arabia presented extended lines of communications and fortunately there were no significant enemy air or sea forces to contend with. The Host Nation was very supportive and resource generous. The Saudi Arabians maintained one of the most modern sea port facilities and modern aerial port facilities yet the shear magnitude of class I at the height of the build-up was staggering, thus adding to the choking of these facilities. There are a number of reasons why the ports became so congested so quickly. I will discuss each of these in this case study.
Having been involved at the Department o f the Army level and working on Class I issues in support of Persian Gulf conflict, I have first hand knowledge of the problems encountered both in CONUS and the desert of Saudi Arabia.
During the course of study this year, in the block on Strategic Freedom of Action and Logistics, Henry Eccles' book,
Logistics
In The National Defense, presents some very thought provoking ideas. of real interest was the section on logistic momentum where he discusses a number of principles or points.
One of these points is that,;"A reporting system should be established in such a way that those who are responsible for the conduct of the operation and its logistic support know the precise state of supply availabilities." 1 The lack of a reporting system in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM is another of the points I will discuss in Lhis study. Another of Eccles' points is regarding logistics responsiveness, "A point of danger is that a supply system may be geared too closely to 1Henry E. Eccles, Logisitics In The National Defense. (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1959), p. 125. peacetime operations; and that it may not be either technically or organizationally prepared for the very great changes that war brings.'"2 This is another area that caused great stress in the build-up phase and will likewise be discussed further in this study.
Another aspect that Eccles points out is, " an inadequate system of planning and controlling the allocation and movement oi shipping in relation to overseas port capacity results in a pile-up of shipping in the overseas ports. This snowballs because there is an immediate resort to 'selective unloading.' This in turn reduces the efficiency of the unloading process; and this in turn causes further congestion.
In the meantime, ships on the high seas must continue voyages to these congested ports because they are carrying urgently needed material; and loading plans in the continental U.S. ports become upset and confused and their operation becomes less efficient."' 3 This point will also be discussed in this study and at length because this particular point caused true congestion and near chaos in the port of Ad Damman, Saudi Arabia.
Additionally, I will discuss problems encountered with production of class I, the shipment and reporting, both from actual civilian contractors as well as from DLA depots.
Encompassing all types of rations, the ration supplement sundry pack that usually is considered a class VI item but troops and then an average of 1000 seavans per week later, a solution had to be found.
The solution was to attempt throughput distribution to units by identifying the seavans to units. This would alleviato the need to "unstuff" the an and sort the commodity. This effort ran astray when it was discovered that the vans and their contents were being erroneously reported by container number. The system was for each shipping activity, regardless of whether it was a DLA depot or a contractor, to report the container number, the commodity or commodities and quantity, the vessel booking, voyage number, and estimated time of arrival to the DPSC transportation office. DPSC would in turn send out a weekly message to the theater to provide some valid planning forecasts. What in fact happened, in a few cases, was that vans reported to be rations were actually carrying. Sbipping records were missing or incomplete." 9
These incidents caused a complete distrust in the system.
On the next page is an example of a DPSC message
reporting what was originally believed to be rations. Even with all these improvements, if shipping activities are not required to use them -we will never learn from our mistakes, or improve the ration distribution system.
The use of these codds is simply described in appendix F of vhe MILSTAMP manual. The one area that was completely overlooked by the shipping activities was the use of commodity codes with NOS (not otherwise specified)in the description.
The MILSTAMP manual addresses the actions to take when using NOS, "Whenever an 'NOS' commodity code is used, additional explanation is always included as a trailer entry using DI to be shipped in two increments: one to arrive the end of December and the other to arrive the middle of January 1991.
During the same timeframe, the personnel at DLA depot operations and the operational rations personnel at DPSC were trying to put together A statement of work to use at Defense Depot Region West -Sharpe, to unitize the MORE ration.
Unitization means to assemble all components to make a single meal and then modulize the meals into a pre-determined number of meals.
This process took approximately 60 days to get underway.
The major problem with these MORE rations was that they were shipped as meal equivalents, the components to make up the ration were shipped separately with the intent of letting the theater assemble them into complete meals. The real question was, who in the theater was going to assemble these meals? The solution was to contract this effort in Saudi and then push these rations to the units. This alternative was successful and by the end of January, DLA was unitizing the MOREs for shipment to Saudi Arabia.
Another problem area was the ration supplement sundry pack (RSSP). being shipped at these rates it is no wonder that the ports became congested, especially when considering the fact that the cargo manifests for surface shipments were either missing, incomplete, or erroneous.
As a result of operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the Chief where, when it will arrive and how it goes on from there.
There is every reason to believe that military traffic management will not be a bottleneck in the transportation system of the future."'1 9 Obviously, the TDS has a different viewpoint which hopefully will be implemented and will produce a different outcome in future conflicts. All aspects of the Total Distribution System study are dealing with the type problems encountered with Class I.
Hopefully, the down-sizing of the military will not cause this study to be discontinued or just put on the shelf. This study has effects on the entire supply system, not just the class I system, and if implemented could help ensure logistical success in the next conflict. 
